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Abstract
Maternal effects can provide offspring with reliable information about the environment they
are likely to experience, but also offer scope for maternal manipulation of young when interests
diverge between parents and offspring. To predict the impact and outcome of parent-offspring
conflict, we model the evolution of maternal effects on local adaptation of young. We find
that parent-offspring conflict strongly influences the stability of maternal effects; moreover, the
nature of the disagreement between parents and young predicts how conflict is resolved: when
mothers favour less extreme mixtures of phenotypes relative to offspring (i.e., when mothers
stand to gain by hedging their bets), mothers win the conflict by providing offspring with only
limited amounts of information. When offspring favour overproduction of one and the same
phenotype across all environments compared to mothers (e.g., when offspring favour a larger
body size), neither side wins the conflict and signaling breaks down. Only when offspring
favour less extreme mixtures relative to their mothers (the case we consider least likely), off-
spring win the conflict and obtain full information about the state of the environment. We
conclude that a partial or complete breakdown of informative maternal effects will be the norm
rather than the exception in the presence of parent-offspring conflict.
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1 Introduction
Maternal effects comprise any causal influence of the environment or phenotype of the mother on
the phenotype of her offspring that is not mediated by genetic transmission (Wolf & Wade, 2009;
Day & Bonduriansky, 2011; Danchin et al., 2011). Such effects have been identified in many
species, and may involve a wide variety of different mechanisms, ranging from hormonal influ-
ences (von Engelhardt & Groothuis, 2011), through the transmission of antibodies (e.g., Boulinier
& Staszewski, 2008) and maternal provisioning of nutrients (e.g., Wells, 2010), to social learning
(Mesoudi et al., 2016) and even active teaching (Rapaport, 2011). It is well established that mater-
nal effects can, at least in principle, strongly influence the course of evolution within a population
(Mousseau & Fox, 1998; Räsänen & Kruuk, 2007; Badyaev & Uller, 2009; Hoyle & Ezard, 2012).
More recently, there has been much discussion of when and why selection might favour the evolu-
tion of such effects themselves (Kuijper et al., 2014; English et al., 2015; Kuijper & Hoyle, 2015;
McNamara et al., 2016; Proulx & Teotónio, 2017).
Adaptive explanations of the evolution of maternal effects often suggest that they serve to pro-
vide offspring with information about the environment they are likely to encounter (Marshall &
Uller, 2007; Shea et al., 2011; Kuijper & Johnstone, 2013; Leimar & McNamara, 2015). This
information allows the young to anticipate the challenges they will face and to develop an appro-
priate phenotypic response (Agrawal et al., 1999; Galloway & Etterson, 2007; McGhee & Bell,
2014; Holeski et al., 2012, but see Uller et al., 2013). For instance, offspring field crickets (Gryllus
pennsylvanicus) born from mothers that have been exposed to predators exhibit greater antipredator
immobility (Storm & Lima, 2010). Other antipredator adaptations have been observed in Daphnia,
where offspring from mothers that have been exposed to predatory stimuli grow larger defensive
helmets (Agrawal et al., 1999). Similar processes also operate in plants, for example in Campanu-
lastrum americanum, where offspring phenotypes are dependent on the maternal light environment,
and those that experience a light environment that matches that of their mother have a 3.4 times
larger fitness in comparison to offspring that develop in different light conditions (Galloway & Et-
terson, 2007). These examples show that in at least some cases, maternal effects facilitate offspring
anticipation of environmental challenges.
Maternal effects, however, do not always operate to the advantage of offspring. In some cases,
they appear to benefit the mother at the expense of individual young (Jaenike, 1986; Einum &
Fleming, 2000; Mayhew, 2001; Janz et al., 2005; McCormick, 2006, reviewed in Marshall & Uller,
2007). For example, in Cephaloleia beetles, maternal survival is increased when ovipositing on
novel plant hosts, whereas individual offspring survival was reduced compared to young on native
hosts (García-Robledo & Horvitz, 2012). This raises the question whether mothers always stand to
gain by supplying information beneficial to their young.
Parents and offspring often face an evolutionary conflict of interest (Trivers, 1974; Parker &
Macnair, 1978; Godfray, 1995; Smiseth et al., 2008; Kilner & Hinde, 2008). This conflict arises
because offspring value their own survival more strongly than that of current or potential future
siblings, while parents value all of their offspring equally (Trivers, 1974). Behavioural ecologists
have focused mostly on conflicts over resource provisioning, in which offspring are selected to
demand more resources than parents are selected to provide (Parker & Macnair, 1978; Godfray,
1995; Hinde et al., 2010; Wells, 2007a,b; Kuijper & Johnstone, 2012). However, this conflict
may influence information exchange as well. In particular, much attention has been devoted to
parents’ acquisition of information about offspring need or hunger, and to what extent they can
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rely on offspring signals of condition (Godfray, 1991; Godfray & Johnstone, 2000; Royle et al.,
2002; Wells, 2003). Here, by contrast, we are concerned with acquisition of information about
the environment by offspring from their parents, but similar issues arise within each context of
information exchange (Uller & Pen, 2011). When there is parent-offspring conflict over the optimal
offspring phenotype, can offspring rely on maternal signals about the environment? Alternatively,
might maternal effects provide a means by which mothers can manipulate offspring phenotype and
enforce their own optima on their young (Müller et al., 2007; Uller, 2008; Kilner & Hinde, 2008;
Tobler & Smith, 2010)?
So far, how parent-offspring conflict affects the evolution of informative maternal effects has
seen surprisingly little formal investigation. A single model by Uller & Pen (2011) has considered
how parent-offspring conflict over dispersal affects the degree of information contained in maternal
effects. Unless offspring are somehow constrained in their response to maternal signals, they find
that parent-offspring conflict typically does not affect the evolution of informative maternal effects,
so that at evolutionary equilibrium, offspring are able to rely on maternal signals to implement
their own optimal strategy. This contrasts markedly with other signalling models that focus on in-
formation transfer from offspring to parents, which suggest that conflict leads to the breakdown of
informative signalling, unless honesty is maintained by some form of signal cost (Godfray et al.,
1991; Johnstone, 1999; Godfray & Johnstone, 2000). Consequently, this raises the question of
whether informative signalling by mothers to offspring is indeed a general outcome of parent off-
spring conflict, as suggested by Uller & Pen (2011), or whether there are contexts in which conflict
can lead to a breakdown of informative maternal signals instead.
To assess how parent-offspring conflict affects the evolution of maternal effects, we focus on
a scenario of conflict over offspring local adaptation in a spatiotemporally varying environment
(Leimar & McNamara, 2015; English et al., 2015; Kuijper & Johnstone, 2016). Fluctuating en-
vironments often favour parents that produce a mixture of offspring phenotypes, containing some
offspring that are adapted and some offspring that are maladapted to the current state of the local
environment (Starrfelt & Kokko, 2012). Producing a mixture of offspring phenotypes ensures that
at least some offspring are likely to survive, even if the local environment changes, thus prevent-
ing the extinction of the parental gene lineage (Ellner, 1986; McNamara, 1995; Leimar, 2005). In
contrast to their parents, however, individual offspring have a higher genetic interest in their own
survival than in that of their siblings. Consequently, offspring favour a lower probability of devel-
oping a currently maladapted phenotype than do their parents, resulting in parent-offspring conflict
over local adaptation (Ellner, 1986).
We explore a situation in which offspring cannot assess the environment they will experience
directly for themselves, but must rely on signals from their mother. A key ingredient of our model is
that mothers can potentially ‘skew’ the information they provide, by signalling in a misleading way.
The question we then seek to answer is whether reliable maternal signalling is stable, allowing for
the persistence of maternal effects, or whether it is vulnerable to disruption by maternal dishonesty.
2 The model
We consider an ‘infinite island’ model (Wright, 1931; Rousset, 2004; Lehmann & Rousset, 2010)
comprising a sexually hermaphroditic metapopulation that is distributed over an infinite number of
patches, each of which contains n adult breeders. Generations are discrete and non-overlapping,
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and in each generation, every breeder produces, as mother, a large number of offspring, each of
which is sired by a random breeder. With probability `, this sire is chosen from the same patch
as the mother (including the possibility of self-fertilisation), while with probability 1− ` the sire is
chosen from a random remote patch. For the sake of tractability, we assume that the population is
haploid, where gametes are produced clonally and pair to form diploid zygotes, which immediately
undergo meiosis to form a new generation of haploid offspring (individual-based simulations as-
suming diploid inheritance and a finite number of patches give similar results, see Figures S6-S8).
Upon birth, a fraction 1−d of newborn young remain on the natal patch, while the remaining frac-
tion d disperse to a random patch in the metapopulation. After dispersal, offspring on a patch, both
native and immigrant, compete for the n breeding vacancies created by the death of the previous
generation. Those that fail to obtain a breeding vacancy die, and the life cycle then repeats. Below
we provide a verbal summary of the model, while a more extensive description is given in section
S2 of the Online Supplement.
Environmental variation Following previous models of maternal influences on offspring phe-
notype determination that do not consider parent-offspring conflict (e.g., Shea et al. 2011; English
et al. 2015; Leimar & McNamara 2015; Kuijper & Johnstone 2016), we consider a spatiotempo-
rally fluctuating environment in which each patch fluctuates between two environmental states, e1
and e2. In each generation, an ei patch can change to an e j patch with probability σi→ j (i 6= j)
while it remains in environmental state ei with probability 1 − σi→ j. Patches fluctuate indepen-
dently of one another, so that at any given time a proportion p1 = σ2→1/(σ1→2 +σ2→1) of patches
is in environmental state e1, while the remainder p2 ≡ 1− p1 is in environmental state e2.
Phenotype determination Upon birth of an offspring, it can adopt one of two phenotypes, z1
or z2. Individuals are ‘locally adapted’ and therefore experience a lower mortality rate when their
phenotype zi is identical to the environment ei of their patch (Kawecki & Ebert, 2004). Individuals
are characterised by the genetically determined strategy fi which reflects the probability that an
offspring develops phenotype z1 as opposed to phenotype z2. Importantly, fi may depend upon an
offspring’s natal environment ei, so we consider the evolution of a strategy f = { f1, f2} that specifies
phenotype determination probabilities for each of the two environments. Our model also accounts
for the possibility that offspring of one phenotype are potentially more costly to the mother (i.e.
they require more maternal resources) than offspring of the opposite phenotype (e.g., Trivers, 1974;
Ellner, 1986; Kuijper & Pen, 2014). Moreover, we allow such maternal production costs to vary
dependent on the local environment ei, so that the parameters βi and γi reflect the maternal cost
of producing a z1 and z2 offspring respectively when the local environment is in state ei. Hence,
the average investment Ei by a mother living in environment ei per offspring is proportional to
fiβi + (1− fi)γi. Following classical life-history models (Smith & Fretwell, 1974; Parker & Mac-
nair, 1978), we assume that the total number of offspring produced is inversely proportional to the
average investment per offspring. Consequently, the proportions of z1 and z2 offspring produced
by a mother living in environment ei are then given by fi/Ei and (1 − fi)/Ei respectively. After
phenotype determination, offspring either disperse or stay in the local patch, with dispersal occur-
ring prior to environmental change. The survival probability of an offspring with phenotype z j
that ends up competing in a patch that is in environmental state e j is given by ωi j. Throughout,
we assume that offspring with a phenotype that matches the local environment always survive, so
that ω11 = ω22 = 1, while z1 offspring in an e2 environment survive with probability ω12 = 1 − c2
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and z2 offspring in an e1 environment survive with probability ω21 = 1− c1. All surviving offspring
in a patch, both immigrant and philopatric, then compete for the n adult breeding positions that
are locally available. The resulting fitness equations, which describe the number of successfully
established offspring born from adults living in each environment are set out in section S2.1 of the
Online Supplement.
2.1 Mapping the battleground
The question now arises to what extent the evolutionary interests of parents and offspring diverge
when it comes to the decision of developing phenotype z1 versus z2. To resolve this issue, we
compare the evolutionarily stable values of f1 and f2 under maternal and under offspring control
(the divergence between these outcomes defining the ‘battleground’ within which parent-offspring
conflict will be played out, Godfray, 1995). To determine the equilibrium probabilities of producing
a z1 phenotype under either maternal or offspring control, we adopt an adaptive dynamics approach
(Geritz et al., 1998; Rousset, 2004; Dercole & Rinaldi, 2008). This assumes that evolution proceeds
by the successive substitution of mutations of small effect, with a clear separation of time scales
between demographic and evolutionary processes (Otto & Day, 2007). We use a direct fitness (also
called neighbour-modulated fitness) approach (Taylor & Frank, 1996; Taylor et al., 2007) to derive
the selection gradient Fi that determines the evolutionary change in the probability fi of producing
a z1 offspring in environment ei (see eq. [S5]). By numerically iterating the selection gradients until
they vanish, we are able to solve numerically for the equilibrium probabilities f ∗1 , f
∗
2 of producing
a z1 phenotype in each of the two environments.
2.2 Resolving the conflict
If the interests of mothers and offspring diverge, how then might maternal-offspring conflict be
resolved? If offspring must rely on mothers for information about the state of the local environment,
could this enable mothers to manipulate the behaviour of their young in each of the two contexts
considered? To evaluate this possibility, we suppose that mothers can assess the state of the local
environment, while offspring cannot (see also Uller & Pen, 2011). Mothers may choose to give or
to withhold a signal from each of their young, with probabilities of giving the signal dependent on
the state of the local environment. Offspring may then choose to develop phenotype z1 or z2, with
probabilities dependent on whether or not they have received a signal from their mother.
The maternal signalling strategy s ≡ (s1,s2) thus specifies the probabilities of giving (rather
than withholding) the signal in each type of patch, while the offspring phenotype determination
strategy q = (qS, qNS) specifies the probabilities of developing a z1 phenotype when a signal is or is
not received. It is the combination of these two strategies that determines the fraction of young fi
that develop as z1 in each environment ei:
fi (si,qS,qNS) = siqS + (1− si)qNS, (1)
so that with probability si a mother living in environment ei provides her offspring with a signal,
who will therefore develop as a z1 offspring with probability qS (and as a z2 offspring with prob-
ability 1− qS). By contrast, with probability 1− si, the mother withholds the signal, in which case
offspring develops as a z1 or z2 offspring with probabilities qNS and 1−qNS respectively. Associated
fitness expressions for the maternal signaling probabilities and offspring phenotype determination
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strategies are given in eqns. (S17 - S20) in the Online supplement. We again assume that evolution
proceeds by the successive substitution of mutations of small effect, with a clear separation of time
scales between demographic and evolutionary processes (Otto & Day, 2007). This allows us to
use a direct fitness approach to derive the selection gradients Si and Q j that determine the rates of
evolutionary change in the probability si of providing offspring a signal in each environment and
the probability q j ∈ {qS,qNS} of producing a z1 offspring in the presence or absence of a signal
(see eqns. [S21,S22]).
To solve the conflict resolution model, we seek to identify equilibrium strategy pairs for which
all selection gradients (for both strategies) are simultaneously equal to zero. To do so, we choose
initial conditions such that the signal is highly informative (e.g., we might choose s1 = 0.9 and
s2 = 0.1) and offspring highly responsive (e.g., fS = 0.9 and fNS = 0.1), and iteratively update the
signalling and phenotype determination probabilities by adding to each the value of the relevant
selection gradient (given the current strategies), bounding the updated values between 0 and 1.
This procedure is repeated until all strategies converge to stable values. The solutions obtained in
this way are robust to changes in the precise starting conditions chosen, and convergence stable
by construction. Note, however, that two mirror-image signalling equilibria are possible in any
particular case – one in which the signal is given more often in environment e1 and withheld more
often in environment e2, and one in which the signal is given more often in environment e2 and
withheld more often in environment e1. These provide offspring with equal information, and thus
have identical consequences in terms of the phenotype determination rates out of each patch type.
For ease of interpretation, however, we consistently choose starting conditions in which the signal
is given more often in environment e1. Individual-based simulations, which assume a continuous
distribution of mutations and no necessary separation of timescales, yield very similar results to the
analytical model (see Figures S6-S8).
3 Results
3.1 The battleground
Figure 1 illustrates the ways in which the interests of mothers and offspring diverge. The graphs
show the stable fraction of z1 offspring produced in environment e1 (blue) and in environment e2
(red), under maternal control (dotted lines) versus under offspring control (solid lines), as a function
of c2, the cost of maladaptation in environment e2 (while holding c1, the cost of maladaptation in
environment e1, constant at 0.8). In general, both mothers and offspring favour higher proportions
of z1 offspring when the cost of maladaptation in environment e2 is low (at the left-hand side of
each graph), and lower proportions of z1 offspring when the cost of maladaptation in environment
e2 is high (at the right-hand side of each graph). However, stable outcomes under maternal versus
offspring control rarely agree precisely.
The three panels of the figure show results for three different sets of parameter values, which
we have chosen to illustrate three possible kinds of ‘disagreement’ between mother and young (see
Supplementary Figure S1 for a more extensive overview of model results).
Scenario 1 (panel A): offspring favour production of more of the locally adapted phenotype in
each environment (i.e. more of phenotype z1 in environment e1, and more of phenotype z2 in envi-
ronment e2); in terms of the graph, the red and blue solid lines for equilibria in the case of offspring
control lie ‘outside’ the corresponding dotted lines for equilibria in the case of maternal control. In
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this scenario, z1 and z2 offspring are equally costly to produce. Under these circumstances, mothers
do best (in either environment) to hedge their bets by producing a certain fraction of young with a
currently (locally) maladapted phenotype, to ensure survival of at least some of their brood in case
the environment changes. Since offspring, by contrast, have a greater evolutionary interest in their
own survival than in that of the brood as a whole, they favour a higher probability of developing
the currently well-adapted phenotype.
Scenario 2 (panel B): Offspring favour production of more of phenotype z1 across both envi-
ronments; in terms of the graph, the red and blue solid lines for equilibria in the case of offspring
control lie above the corresponding dotted lines for equilibria in the case of maternal control. In this
case, z2 offspring are twice as costly for mothers to produce as are z1 offspring. Under these circum-
stances, mothers favour mixtures of offspring phenotypes that are more biased towards the cheaper
z1 phenotype across both environments, because producing a larger fraction of costly young re-
duces their overall fecundity. By comparison, offspring are less concerned with maternal fecundity
relative to their own survival, and so favour mixtures of phenotypes that are more biased towards
the expensive z2 phenotype, across both environments.
Scenario 3 (panel C): Offspring favour production of more of the locally maladapted phenotype
in each environment (i.e. more of phenotype z2 in environment e1, and more of phenotype z1 in
environment e2); in terms of the graph, the red and blue solid lines for equilibria in the case of
offspring control lie ‘inside’ the corresponding dotted lines for equilibria in the case of maternal
control. In this case, maternal costs of producing one phenotype versus the other are assumed to
depend on the local environment: specifically, we assume that a z2 young is twice as costly to pro-
duce as a z1 young in environment e1, while z1 young are twice as costly to produce than z2 young
in environment e2. In this case, mothers favour more extreme mixtures that are biased towards the
the locally-adapted phenotype that is the cheapest to produce in that particular environment, while
offspring favour less extreme mixtures that feature more of the locally costly phenotype.
We have chosen parameter values to highlight the different kinds of conflict that can arise be-
tween mothers and young, because the nature of the ‘disagreement’ turns out to affect the resolution
of the conflict, as detailed below.
3.2 Resolution of the conflict
How is parent-offspring conflict resolved when offspring control the determination of their pheno-
type, but must rely on maternal signals about the state of the local environment? We can categorise
outcomes of the model according to the extent of information supplied by mothers to their young
- offspring may obtain (i) full information about the environment (because the presence or absence
of the maternal signal is perfectly correlated with the state of the environment), (ii) partial infor-
mation (because the signal is given more commonly in one environment than in the other, but the
correlation is imperfect) or (iii) no information (because the presence or absence of the signal is
uncorrelated with the environment).
Alternatively, taking into account both the probabilities of the signal being given or withheld,
and the response of offspring in each case, we can categorise outcomes according to the degree to
which the realised probabilities of producing each phenotype match the values favoured by moth-
ers versus young - (i) parents may win (i.e. the outcome matches what evolves under maternal
control), (ii) neither ‘side’ may win (i.e. the outcome diverges from what evolves under either
maternal or offspring control), or (iii) offspring may win (i.e. the outcome matches what evolves
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under offspring control). Figure 2 shows the regions of parameter space in which the model predicts
different levels of information transfer, while Figure 2 shows the regions in which mothers or off-
spring (or neither) are predicted to win (with equivalent results for additional regions of parameter
space shown in Supplementary Figures S3 and S4).
As detailed below, comparison of Figures 2 and 3 with Figure 1 reveals that there is not neces-
sarily a strict relationship between the nature of the parent/offspring battleground and the outcome
(in terms of either information conveyed or who wins the battle). At the same time, however, there
is a strong correlation, such that each of the three battleground scenarios we list above is typically
associated with a different kind of outcome.
3.2.1 Scenario 1: when offspring favour more extreme mixtures than their mothers, moth-
ers typically win the conflict by providing partial information
When offspring favour more extreme mixtures of phenotypes relative to their mothers (as in Fig-
ure 1A), maternal signals often evolve to be partially informative to offspring, particularly when
survival costs of a maladapted offspring (c1, c2) are large in both environments (Figure 2A, right
corner). In this case, offspring are selected to rely on maternal information, as the alternative results
in substantial costs due to local maladaptation. However, by limiting the amount of information
about the local environment, mothers force offspring to increase their level of bet-hedging, thus
resulting in a less extreme mixture of offspring phenotypes that coincides with the maternal opti-
mum. (see Figure 3A). An example of such a partially informative signaling strategy is given in
Figures 4A,B (see Figure S6 for a corresponding individual-based simulation).
Note, however, that coevolution between maternal signals and offspring responsiveness can
also lead to alternative outcomes: when the cost of maladaptation is large in one environment, but
small in the other, maternal signals evolve to become uninformative (white regions in Figure 2A), as
mothers favour the exclusive production of a single offspring phenotype (the one having the highest
costs of maladaptation) across the two environments. Conversely, when costs of maladaptation are
modest and of similar magnitude in both environments, parental and offspring optima align, leading
parents to evolve signals that are fully informative to offspring (black region in Figure 2A).
3.2.2 Scenario 2: when offspring favour more of one phenotype, then typically neither side
wins, and signalling often breaks down
As described above, when one phenotype is more costly to produce than the other, offspring favour
mixtures in both environments that are more biased towards the more expensive phenotype (here
z2) than do mothers (see the battleground in Figure 1B). By far the commonest outcome for this
type of battleground is that signaling breaks down (light grey areas in Figure 2B), thus resulting
in unconditional offspring phenotype determination strategies. Who wins the conflict now starts to
depend on the relative costs of maladaptation (Figure 3B): when survival costs of maladaptation are
high in environment e1, yet very low in environment e2 (white regions in Figure 3B), both parents
and offspring favour the production of a single phenotype (z1; which matches the most severe
environment) across both environments, so conflict is absent. When costs of maladaptation in
environment e2 are slightly larger, however, offspring born in environment e2 favour the production
of costly z2 offspring, while mothers still favour the production of z1 offspring in both environments.
However, in the presence of an uninformative signal, offspring are forced to play an unconditional
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strategy which results in the exclusive production of z1 offspring in both environments, so that
mothers can be said to win the conflict (light grey area in Figure 3B).
For even higher costs of maladaptation in environment e2 in Figure 3B, mothers again favour the
exclusive production of z1 offspring across both environments (see Figure 4C, D for a detailed
example). However, offspring now favour the production of a mixture of both z1 and z2 offspring
in the absence of any maternal information, so that the resolution is one in which neither parent
nor offspring wins the conflict (black region in Figure 3B). Finally, when costs of maladaptation
are high in environment e2, but not in environment e1 (right part in Figure 2B), mothers too now
start to favour the production of some costly z2 offspring in environment e2 (see Figure 4E, F for
a detailed example). However, as offspring favour a much larger proportion of z2 offspring in
environment e2 than mothers do, mothers only provide a partially informative signal to offspring
(dark grey area in Figure 2B). The resulting uncertainty leads to less extreme proportion of z2
offspring in environment e2, but also leads to the production of some z2 offspring in environment
e1. Consequently, again neither parents or offspring can be said to win the conflict (see Figure 4E).
3.2.3 Result 3: when offspring favour less extreme mixtures than their mothers, offspring
typically win the conflict, with mothers providing full information
When phenotype z2 is more costly to produce in environment e1, while phenotype z1 is more costly
to produce in environment e2, mothers favour mixtures that are more extreme than offspring do
(see the corresponding battleground in Figure 1C). Regarding the resolution of the conflict, Figure
2C shows that maternal signals either evolve to be fully informative, or that offspring evolve to be
unresponsive to maternal signals (barring narrow regions in which signals are partially informative).
In addition, Figure 3C shows that, for this configuration of maternal production costs, there is
a substantial region where conflict is absent. However, when conflict occurs, offspring win the
conflict as a result of these fully informative signals.
A more detailed example is shown in Figures 4G, H: to avoid the production of offspring that
are more costly in terms of maternal resources, mothers favour extreme mixtures consisting only
of z1 offspring in environment e1 and only of z2 offspring in environment e2 (blue dotted line
in Figure 4C). Offspring, however, favour a less extreme mixture of phenotypes (red solid line).
Mothers are then selected to provide offspring with the maximum amount of information, as this
yields mixtures of phenotypes that are closest to what is favoured by the mother. By contrast, would
mothers reduce the information content of the maternal signal, they would only select offspring to
produce even less extreme mixtures that are even further away from the maternal optima. Hence,
provided with complete environmental information, offspring can attain their respective optima in
each environment (black dotted and red lines overlap in Figure 4C).
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4 Discussion
While our model is general in formulation, it is applicable to many concrete types of maternal
effect, whenever mothers can influence the cues available to offspring in a way that potentially
reflects the local environment. A biological example of such a mechanism is the provision of dif-
ferent concentrations of a maternal hormone or small RNAs to young in different environments
(Groothuis & Schwabl, 2008; Meylan et al., 2012; Liebers et al., 2014). In this kind of situation,
mothers can provide offspring with an informative signal by varying hormone or small RNA con-
centrations markedly across environments, or by contrast, withold information by providing more
similar concentrations of the same hormone across environments. The same reasoning applies to
heritable epimutations (Heard & Martienssen, 2014), where strong vs weak differences in DNA
methylation of gametes between environments reflect a strongly vs weakly informative maternal
signal.
Our main conclusion is that parent-offspring conflict can have a significant impact on the evo-
lution of informative maternal effects, even when offspring are unconstrained in their responses.
The key feature of our model that leads to this outcome is that parents are allowed to adopt an
imperfectly informative signalling strategy, and to ‘skew’ offspring responses towards their pre-
ferred outcome by independently adjusting the probabilities with which they give or withold sig-
nals in each environment. When mothers can potentially manipulate offspring in this way, we find
that parent-offspring conflict often leads to a partial or even a complete breakdown in informa-
tion transfer at equilibrium (just as it can do in models of signalling of need by offspring to their
parents, Johnstone & Godfray, 2002). Consider, for instance, the case in which parents favour a
higher proportion of a cheaper phenotype among their young, compared to that favoured by their
offspring, and in which they do so regardless of the local environment. Under these conditions, it
is hard for informative maternal signals to persist. If offspring take advantage of this information
by responding to such a signal, an individual mother can always ‘push’ her young closer towards
her own optimum by misrepresenting the state of the environment, and signalling in a way typical
of local conditions that elicit a higher proportion of the cheaper phenotype. Consequently, we con-
clude that parent-offspring conflict may provide a powerful explanation for the apparent weakness
of transgenerational plasticity in nature (for reviews see Uller et al., 2013; Heard & Martienssen,
2014)
The possibility in our model for parents to independently adjust the probabilities with which
they give or withhold signals in each environment explains the contrast between our results and
those of Uller & Pen (2011). In their pioneering study of the impact of parent-offspring conflict
on the evolution of maternal signals, Uller & Pen (2011) found that offspring typically evolve
to be highly sensitive to maternal information about the state of the environment, regardless of
any discrepancy between maternal and offspring optima. Their main model, however, assumes
that offspring are provided with a highly discrete signal mi that is tied to a particular patch type
ei. Consequently, even the slightest divergence between maternal signals in each environment
(i.e., mi 6= m j) provides offspring with perfect information about the environment. In other words,
mothers are only able to withhold information to offspring when they are able to hold the signal
mi exactly equal to m j, which would require considerable canalization in the face of mutation and
drift in either signal.
In a supplementary model, Uller & Pen (2011) also briefly analyzed the evolution of maternal
assessment errors, where making an error in environment ei implies that offspring are provided
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with signal m j rather than signal mi. However, they found that these maternal errors do not evolve.
A key assumption of this extended model is, however, that the error is constrained to be identical
across both environments: hence, a nonzero error only evolves when the advantage of providing
offspring with a wrong signal in environment ei outweighs the disadvantage of providing offspring
with a wrong signal in environment e j too. As a consequence, there is no scope for parents to inde-
pendently adjust the probability of a signal being given in each environment, and so no possibility
for parents to skew offspring responses in their own favour by misrepresenting the environment in
a biased manner. Overall, this raises the question which mechanism is more realistic: are maternal
effects indeed constrained as in the model of Uller & Pen (2011), or is there sufficient flexibility
as required by the current model? Because maternal effects like hormones are often highly flexible
(e.g., Müller et al., 2004; Krist & Munclinger, 2015) and characterized by continuous (rather than
discrete) variation across environments (e.g., Pavitt et al., 2014; Lessells et al., 2016), we suggest
that the scope for maternal manipulation, as described by the current model, is likely to be sub-
stantial. Perhaps one way through which both the model of Uller & Pen (2011) and the current
one can be reconciled, however, is when offspring are able to enforce honesty in maternal signals,
so that maternal manipulation is not possible. It is therefore important that future models assess
the evolutionary potential for enforcing honesty in maternal signals, whether this indeed leads to
offspring winning the conflict, and how transgenerational plasticity is affected by honest signals.
Yet, we emphasize that the potential for manipulation cannot be ruled out a priori for any signaling
system (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Laidre & Johnstone, 2013), and maternal signals are no exception
to this.
Another key conclusion of our model is that a reduction in maternal information transfer does
not necessarily imply that either mothers (or offspring) win the conflict. Rather, the outcome of the
conflict typically depends on the nature of the disagreement between mothers and young (see Figure
1), which depends on the specific trait that is studied. We suggest that scenarios in which mothers
favour a more even mixture of phenotypes than do offspring (see Figure 1A) are more likely to
result in partially informative signals and mothers winning the conflict (see Figure 3A). This type of
outcome is particularly likely when alternative offspring phenotypes impose roughly similar costs
on their mothers. One possible example is when individuals bet-hedge defences against multiple
stressors, as they do when resistance to one strain of parasite trades off against resistance to another
strain (strain-specific immunity: Little et al., 2003; Schmid-Hempel, 2005. While resistance in such
contexts is often studied in the context of heterozygosity (e.g., Penn et al., 2002), an accumulating
number of studies have shown that parasite resistance is, in part, influenced by transgenerational
effects (Little et al., 2003; Boulinier & Staszewski, 2008; Rechavi, 2014; Pigeault et al., 2016). Our
model predicts that parents would be selectively favored to produce more even mixtures of offspring
resistant to one parasite strain versus another, while offspring themselves favour resistance against
the parasite that is commonest in current local environment. In contexts like these, we would expect
that mothers only provide their offspring with limited amounts of information about local parasite
prevalence (leading to limited amounts of transgenerational plasticity - Uller, 2008; Holeski et al.,
2012), resulting in mothers winning the conflict.
For those traits for which offspring always favour overproduction of the costliest phenotype
relative to mothers (see Figure 1B), it is more difficult to predict who wins the conflict: dependent
on the parameters involved, either the offspring, the mother, or neither wins the conflict (Figure
3B). More important, however, is our finding that maternal information transfer can completely
break down in this scenario, resulting in an absence of transgenerational plasticity (Figure 2B),
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which is particularly likely to occur when costs of maladaptation are modest. We believe that the
battleground depicted in Figure 1B applies to numerous traits that have been previously studied
in the context of parent-offspring conflict. For example, when the trait in question is offspring
size (Smith & Fretwell, 1974), offspring will always favour a larger size than mothers themselves
(Parker & Macnair, 1978; Einum & Fleming, 2000; Parker et al., 2002; Kuijper & Johnstone, 2012).
Similarly, when the trait in question is germination or diapause, offspring favour earlier germination
than do their mothers because this enhances their probability of survival, while mothers favour later
germination because this reduces competition with siblings (Ellner, 1986). Finally, in the context
of sex allocation, mothers favour overproduction of the cheaper sex (Trivers, 1974; Kuijper & Pen,
2014), or the sex that is least affected by local competition (Werren et al., 2002; Pen, 2006; Wild
& West, 2009).
For those traits for which offspring favour less extreme mixtures relative to their mothers (see
Figure 1C), we predict that it is nearly always offspring who win the conflict, unless costs of
maladaptation are very high (Figure 3C). More importantly, we predict that maternal signals are
often fully informative in such scenarios. However, we struggle to think of specific traits that are
likely to fit these assumptions.
Summing up, we make two main, testable predictions. First, since parent-offspring conflict will
often partially or completely destabilise maternal signalling, we predict that informative maternal
effects are more likely to evolve, and to exert stronger effects, where conflict between parent and
offspring is less pronounced. In other words, informative maternal effects should be strongest in
contexts of female monogamy or when females reproduce asexually. Such a prediction could, for
example be tested among closely related species with different mating systems, as is the case for
the nematode genus Caenorhabditis (Fierst et al., 2015; Teotónio et al., 2017). Second, given
that the impact of parent-offspring conflict depends upon the nature of the disagreement between
parent and offspring, we predict that at least partially informative maternal effects are most likely
to evolve or persist (even in the face of parent-offspring conflict) when different phenotypes impose
similar costs to mothers (e.g., bet-hedging against different strains of parasites), we would expect
partially informative signals to evolve. By contrast, breakdown of maternal signalling is a more
likely outcome for traits in which one offspring phenotype is more costly to mothers than other
offspring phenotypes (e.g., dispersal, sex allocation, germination), particularly when the costs of
local maladaptation are modest.
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5 Figure captions
Figure 1 Stable probabilities of producing a phenotype z1 offspring in environments e1 (blue
lines) and e2 (red lines) respectively, plotted against the cost of maladaptation c2 in environment e2.
Panel A: both offspring phenotypes are equally costly to produce to mothers (β1 = β2 = γ1 = γ2 = 1).
Consequently, mothers (dashed lines) favour more even mixtures of offspring phenotypes. By con-
trast, offspring favour more extreme mixtures that are biased towards the phenotype with the high-
est survival in the local environment (i.e., offspring favour more z2 in environment e2 and more z1
in environment e1). Panel B: when phenotype z2 is more costly to produce in both environments
(β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2), the probability of producing z2 offspring is reduced. However, as off-
spring are more related to themselves than to their mothers, offspring favour a greater probability of
producing more costly z2 offspring in both environments. Panel C: Maternal production costs are
environment dependent, so z2 young are more costly (less costly) to produce than z1 young in envi-
ronment e1 (in environment e2); (β1 = 1,β2 = 2,γ1 = 2,γ2 = 1). Consequently, mothers favour more
extreme mixtures of offspring phenotypes that are biased towards the phenotype that is cheaper to
produce in each environment. By contrast, offspring favour a larger probability of developing as
the more costly phenotype, leading them to favour more even mixtures of offspring phenotypes.
Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = 0.2, σ21 = 0.25, n = 1, c1 = 0.83.
Figure 2 Phenotype determination when offspring rely on the maternal signal: the information
content of the maternal signal s = (s1,s2) for the three different scenarios of conflict considered
in Figure 1. Panel A: offspring phenotypes are equally costly to produce to mothers. For a wide
range of costs of maladaptation, mothers evolve signals that are partially informative to offspring,
although other outcomes also occur. Panel B: when the z2 phenotype is more costly to produce for
mothers in both environments, maternal signals always evolve to be uninformative when conflict
occurs. Panel C: when the z1 and z2 phenotypes are more costly to produce in the respective
environments e2 and e1, maternal signals typically evolve to be fully informative, apart from a
narrow boundary in which signals are only partially informative. The information content H of
the signal is calculated as a measure of entropy weighed by the probability of receiving and not
receiving a maternal signal in both environments: H = 1 − 12 (s1 + s2)F[s1/(s1 + s2)] − [1 −
1
2 (s1 +
s2)]F[(1− s1)/(1− s1 + 1− s2)], where F[x] = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). See Figure S2 for the
corresponding equilibrium probabilities of producing offspring with phenotype z1 when offspring
rely on a maternal signal. In addition, Figure S3 plots outcomes for an asymmetric environment
where e1 patches are more common than e2 patches. Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = 0.15,
σ21 = 0.15, n = 1.
Figure 3 Phenotype determination when offspring rely on the maternal signal: who wins the
conflict? Panel A: when offspring favour more extreme mixtures of phenotypes than mothers,
mothers can be said to win the conflict by restricting the information content of the maternal signal.
Panel B: when offspring favour mixtures that are more biased towards one phenotype (z2) relative
to their mothers, the conflict is either won by offspring, mothers or neither of them, dependent on
the relative strength of the costs of maladaptation in each environment. Panel C: when offspring
favour mixtures that are less extreme relative to what is favored by their mothers, offspring win the
conflict, as a fully informative maternal signal never results in more extreme mixtures than what is
favored by offspring. Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = 0.1, σ21 = 0.25, n = 1.
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Figure 4 Examples of phenotype determination strategies (top row) and resulting signalling strate-
gies (bottom row). Panels A, B: when offspring favour more extreme mixtures of phenotypes than
mothers, mothers evolve only partially informative signals (panel B). As offspring only receive a
limited amount of environmental information, offspring produce less extreme phenotypic mixtures,
and mothers win the conflict (panel A). Panels C, D: when offspring favour phenotypic mixtures
that are more biased towards one phenotype (z2), uninformative maternal signals commonly evolve
(panel D), so that neither parents nor offspring win the conflict (panel C). Panels E, F: when off-
spring favour less extreme mixtures of phenotypes than mothers, mothers evolve fully informative
signals (panel F). As a result, offspring obtain complete environmental information, resulting in
offspring winning the conflict (panel C). Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = σ21 = 0.15, n = 1.
Specific parameters for the different panels: A, B: c1 = c2 = 0.95, β1 = β2 = γ1 = γ2 = 1; C, D:
c1 = 0.5, c2 = 0.8, β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2; E, F: c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.8, β1 = γ2 = 1, β2 = γ1 = 2. The
scenario in panels C, D where offspring favour phenotypic mixtures that are more biased towards
one phenotype (z2) is further highlighted in Supplementary Figure S5.
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Online Supplement
S1 Supplementary Figures
Figure S1 Stable probabilities of producing a phenotype z1 offspring in environments e1 (first
column) and e2 (second column) respectively, plotted against the cost of maladaptation in each
environment for comparable parameter values as in Figure 1. Panels A, B: both offspring pheno-
types are equally costly to produce to mothers (β1 = β2 = γ1 = γ2 = 1). Panels C, D: phenotype z2
is more costly to produce in both environments (β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2). Panels E, F: Maternal
production costs are dependent on the local environment, so z2 young are more costly (less costly)
to produce than z1 young in environment e1 (in environment e2); (β1 = 1,β2 = 2,γ1 = 2,γ2 = 1).
Consequently, mothers favour more extreme mixtures of offspring phenotypes that are biased to-
wards the phenotype that is cheaper to produce in each environment. By contrast, offspring favour
a larger probability of developing as the more costly phenotype, leading them to favour more even
mixtures of offspring phenotypes. Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = σ21 = 0.25, n = 1.
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Figure S2 Phenotype determination when offspring rely on the maternal signal: the equilibrium
probabilities of producing offspring with phenotype z1 in environment e1 (panels A, C, E) and e2
(panels B, D, F) respectively. Each row corresponds to the different scenarios of parent-offspring
conflict shown in Figure 2. Panels A, B: both phenotypes are equally costly to produce to mothers
(β1 = β2 = γ1 = γ2 = 1). Panels C, D: phenotype z2 is twice as costly to produce in both environments
than phenotype z1 (β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2). Panels E, F: phenotype z1 is twice as costly to produce
as phenotype z2 in environment e2 and phenotype z2 is twice as costly to produce as phenotype z1
in environment e1 (β1 = γ2 = 1, β2 = γ1 = 2). Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = σ21 = 0.25, n = 1.
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Figure S3 Phenotype determination when offspring rely on the maternal signal: the information
content of the maternal signal s = (s1,s2) for various regimes of environmental change. Panels A-C:
a very slowly changing environment where both types of environment are equally common. Note
that fully informative signals can evolve regardless of the underlying battleground (see Figure 1).
However, such fully informative signals are rarest when offspring favour overproduction of one
phenotype (z2) relative to their mothers (panel B). Panels D-F: a slowly fluctuating, asymmetric
environment. Results are similar to panels A-C, except that fully informative signals do not evolve
when offspring favour overproduction of one phenotype (z2) relative to their mothers (panel E).
Panels G-I: a randomly fluctuating environment. Fully informative strategies do not evolve, unless
mothers favour more extreme mixtures than offspring (panel I). When costs of producing offspring
are environment-dependent, mothers favor overproducing zi offspring in environment ei for the
sake of fecundity, despite that offspring survival is random relative to phenotype. Offspring again
favor a more even mixture, so that maternal signals again evolve to be fully informative. Panels
J-L: a highly asymmetric environment, in which environment e1 is common and environment e2
is very rare. For a broad range of costs of maladaptation c1 and c2, we find that both parents and
offspring agree on producing only z1 offspring (top left corners in panels J, L). As a monomorphism
is favored by both parents and offspring, environmental information via maternal signals is not
selectively favored. Only when costs of maladaptation in the rarer environment e2 are much more
severe than costs in the common environment e1 do we find that maternal signals can be partially
or even fully informative (panels J, L). However, when offspring favour more of one phenotype
(z2) than their mothers (panel K), signaling still completely breaks down. This is because mothers
will favour overproduction of z1instead, as this phenotype matches the commoner environment e1.
Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, n = 1.
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Figure S4 Phenotype determination when offspring rely on the maternal signal: who is winning
the conflict? The key conclusion to take from this figure is that who wins the conflict is highly
robust to the rate of environmental change and the relative frequency of environment e1 versus e2.
Figure 3A in the main text concludes that when offspring favour more extreme mixtures, conflict
is either absent or mothers win the conflict. Here we show that this holds for all environmental
configurations (first column). Figure 3B concludes that it either mothers, neither or offspring win
the conflict when offspring favour more of one phenotype (z2). The second column of the current
figure show that this result extends to other rates of change, unless environments change randomly
(panel J), in which case offspring almost always win the conflict. Figure 3C concludes that offspring
are the most likely to win the conflict when offspring favour more even mixtures relative to their
parents. The third column shows that this result extends to other environmental configurations as
well. Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, n = 1.
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Figure S5 More examples of phenotype determination strategies (top row) and signalling strate-
gies (bottom row) when offspring favour more of one phenotype (z2) than mothers (see also Figure
4C, D) in the main text. Panels A, B: whereas maternal signals often evolve to be uninforma-
tive when offspring favour more of z2 than their mothers (see Figure 3B), mothers are selected
to provide offspring with information when the cost of maladaptation in environment e2 becomes
very high. By providing offspring with a signal, mothers prevent offspring from evolving an un-
conditional strategy that would result in the production of a high number of resource-costly z2
offspring everywhere. However, mothers only provide offspring with a partially informative signal.
In response to this uncertainty about the local environment, offspring are selected to produce less
extreme mixtures of offspring, which brings the overall proportion of resource-costly z2 offspring
that are produced in environment e2 closer to the maternal optimum. At the same time however,
the proportion of z2 offspring produced in environment e1 lies further away from the maternal opti-
mum. However, the absolute number of z2 offspring produced in e1 is still much lower than that in
e2, thus resulting in a lower overall resource cost to mothers. Panel C, D: when costs of maladap-
tation in environment e2 are very high, yet low in environment e2, mothers are selected to provide
offspring with complete information about the environment. By contrast, a hypothetical reduction
in the information content of the signal would favour offspring to produce a mixture that is heavily
biased towards z2 offspring, coming at a substantial cost to the mother. Only by providing offspring
with a fully informative signal, can mothers prevent the overproduction of resource-costly z2 off-
spring in both environments. As a consequence, however, offspring can be said to win the conflict.
Parameters: d = 0.1, ` = 0.5, σ12 = σ21 = 0.15, n = 1, β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2. Panels A, B: c1 = 0.5,
c2 = 0.95. Panels C, D: c1 = 0.2, c2 = 0.95.
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Figure S6 The evolution towards a partially informative equilibrium where phenotype determi-
nation diverges across the two environments: individual-based simulations. Both phenotypes are
equally costly to produce for mothers: β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 1. Dashed lines reflect the candidate
ESSs found by the analytical model. Panels A, B: the evolution of the maternal signals s1 and s2
over time. Panels C, D: the evolution of the offspring phenotype determination loci qS and qNS
over evolutionary time. Panels E, F: the evolution of the resulting phenotype determination prob-
abilities over time. For each generation, a histogram (containing 200 bins) of phenotypic values
is plotted, where values are quartic root transformed to aid visibility. Parameters: c1 = c2 = 0.83,
σ12 = σ21 = 0.25, n = 1, ` = 0.5, d = 0.1, µ = 0.01, σ2µ = 0.0001.
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Figure S7 Evolution towards an uninformative equilibrium where phenotype determination is
identical across both environments: individual-based simulations. Phenotype z2 is twice as costly
to produce to mothers as phenotype z1: β1 = β2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 2. See Figure S6 for a description of
the individual panels and a listing of the corresponding parameters.
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Figure S8 Evolution towards a fully informative equilibrium where phenotype determination is
strongly environment-dependent: individual-based simulations. Phenotype z2 is twice as costly to
produce to mothers as phenotype z1 in environment e1, while costs are reversed in environment e1:
β1 = 1, β2 = 2, γ1 = 2, γ2 = 1. See Figure S6 for a description of the individual panels and a listing
of the corresponding parameters.
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S2 Model description
S2.1 Fitness expressions
Here we derive a demographical model of phenotype determination in a binary environment (see
pp. 460-465 in Otto & Day, 2007 for a pedagogical introduction and Rousset, 2004; Lehmann
& Rousset, 2010 for reviews). We use a direct fitness approach (Taylor & Frank, 1996; Taylor
et al., 2007), which calculates the expected number of descendants of a focal ‘recipient allele’ by
summing the fitness effects of interactions with the different phenotypes of actors in the population
(see Taylor & Frank, 1996 for an introduction to this approach).
Let w ji describe the expected fitness of a mutant gene copy in an adult member of the popula-
tion, reflecting the expected number of offspring (bearing the mutant gene copy) that successfully
establish themselves as breeders in environment e j when born from a focal mutant adult living in
environment ei. We assume that the focal mutant adult produces half its offspring via the female
role (in which case it is fertilized by a random patch mate including itself), while the other half of
its offspring result from sirings in the male role. We then have
w ji =
1
2
fˆ fi
f˜ fi βi +
(
1− f˜ fi
)
γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω1 j
C ji
(¯
f, f
) +d 2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω1 j
C jk (f, f)
]
+
1
2
1− fˆ fi
f˜ fi βi +
(
1− f˜ fi
)
γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω2 j
C ji
(¯
f, f
) +d 2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω2 j
C jk (f, f)
]
+
1
2
`
fˆ mi
f¯iβi +
(
1− f¯i
)
γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω1 j
C ji
(¯
f, f
) +d 2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω1 j
C jk (f, f)
]
+
1
2
`
1− fˆ mi
f¯iβi +
(
1− f¯i
)
γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω2 j
C ji
(¯
f, f
) +d 2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω2 j
C jk (f, f)
]
+
1
2
(1− `)
2∑
k=1
pk
fˆ m,remotek
fkβk + (1− fk)γk
[
(1−d)
nσk→ jω1 j
C jk (f, f)
+d
2∑
h=1
phnσh→ jω1 j
C jh (f, f)
]
+
1
2
(1− `)
2∑
k=1
pk
1− fˆ m,remotek
fkβk + (1− fk)γk
[
(1−d)
nσk→ jω2 j
C jk (f, f)
+d
2∑
h=1
phnσh→ jω2 j
C jh (f, f)
]
. (S1)
The first line in the expression above reflects the number of successfully established mutant off-
spring who attain the z1 phenotype, born from a focal adult individual acting as a female. The
strategy fˆ fi denotes the probability that a focal’s own offspring who bear the mutant allele (denoted
by a ^) attain the z1 phenotype when born in in environment ei and when the focal adult indi-
vidual acts as a female (denoted by superscript f). Following classical life-history theory (Smith
& Fretwell, 1974), we assume that the focal’s fecundity in the female role is given by 1/Ei( f˜ fi ),
where Ei( f˜ fi ) is the average investment per offspring in environment ei: Ei( f˜
f
i ) = f˜
f
i βi +
(
1− f˜ fi
)
γi
(see section “phenotype determination” in the main text). Here, f˜ fi denotes the average phenotype
determination strategy in the focal’s brood (denoted by a ∼) when the focal adult individual acts as
a female. The part in straight brackets describes the fitness of the focal’s offspring upon birth, who
remain at the natal patch with probability 1 − d, subsequently experience environmental change
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with probability σi→ j and survive with probability ω1 j in the novel e j environment. After survival,
the focal’s offspring compete with a total number of C ji(¯f, f) philopatric and immigrant offspring
for each of the n breeding positions (see eq. [S2] below), where f¯ = [ f¯1, f¯2] and f = [ f1, f2] denote
the average phenotype determination strategies in the local patch and the population as a whole
respectively. Alternatively, offspring disperse with probability d to randomly chosen remote patch.
With probability pk = σ j→k/(σk→ j +σ j→k), the environmental state of this patch is ek. Following
environmental change and survival, offspring compete with all C jk(f, f) juveniles for one of the n
adult breeding positions. The second line in eq. (S1) reflects the successful establishment of z2
offspring born from a focal adult when acting in the female role and can be derived in a similar
fashion as the first line. Lines three and four reflect the expected number of successfully established
z1 and z2 offspring when the focal adult acts as a male who mates randomly in the local patch (with
probability `), with the focal’s strategy given by fˆ mFecundity is now given by the average fecundity
of all females in the local patch 1/( f¯iβi +
(
1− f¯i
)
γi), where f¯i is the average phenotype of offspring
born in the local patch. Finally, lines five and six reflect the expected number of successfully es-
tablished z1 and z2 offspring when the focal adult acts as male who mates in a randomly chosen
remote patch (with probability 1 − `). In this case case the phenotype determination of the focal
offspring in environment ek is given by fˆ
m,remote
k .
The total number of C ji(¯f, f) surviving offspring that compete for breeding positions in ei patch
that later changes to environmental state e j is given by
C ji(¯f, f) =
n
f¯iβi +
(
1− f¯i
)
γi
(1−d)
(
f¯iω1 j +
(
1− f¯i
)
ω2 j
)
+m j (f) . (S2)
The first part in the expression above reflects the total number of offspring produced in the natal
patch, which is given by a female’s average fecundity in the local patch 1/[ f¯iβi + (1− f¯i)γi] times
the number of locally breeding females n. A proportion 1 − d of these offspring remain in the
natal patch and survive with probability f¯iω1 j + (1− f¯i)w2 j. The term m j(f) in the expression above
reflects the total number of juveniles that are immigrant to the e j patch:
m j (f) = d
2∑
k=1
pk
n
fkβk + (1− fk)γk
(
fkω1 j + (1− fk)ω2 j
)
, (S3)
where immigrants have been born in patches in environmental state ek (at frequency pk), and the
probability of producing a z1 offspring is given by the global average phenotype fk. Note that
survival is determined by the environment of arrival, e j.
Finally, the mutant transition matrix B, with elements b ji = w ji, then comprises the transition
probabilities between all the different classes of mutants:
B =
[
w11 w12
w21 w22
]
, (S4)
while the matrix A ≡ B|ˆff=ˆfm=f˜f=f˜m=¯f=f denotes the resident transition matrix which comprises the
transition probabilities between the different classes of residents.
S2.2 Selection gradients
Using a direct fitness approach (Taylor & Frank, 1996; Taylor et al., 2007) and a standard result on
evolution in class structured populations (e.g., Box 10.2 in Otto & Day 2007), the selection gradient
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Fi on the phenotype determination strategy fi is then given by
Fi =
∑
j={1,2}
∑
k={1,2}
v juk
[
∂b jk
∂ fˆ fi
rˆfk +
∂b jk
∂ f˜ fi
r˜fk
+
∂b jk
∂ fˆ mi
rˆmk +
∂b jk
∂ fˆ m,remotei
fˆ m,remotek +
∂b jk
∂ f¯i
r¯k
]∣∣∣∣∣ˆ
ff=ˆfm=f˜f=f˜m=¯f=f
, (S5)
where v j is the reproductive value of adults that have established themselves in a patch in envi-
ronmental state e j patch and uk the stable class frequency of adult breeders in environment ek. In
addition, rˆfk and rˆ
m
k denote relatedness between a focal adult individual living in environment ek and
its locally produced offspring born from its eggs and sperm respectively, while r˜fk denotes related-
ness between a focal adult individual living in environment ek and any offspring in its brood when
acting as a female. The coefficient rˆm,remotek denotes relatedness between a focal adult male and its
remotely sired offspring. Finally, r¯k denotes relatedness between a focal adult and any locally born
offspring. Expressions for these relatedness coefficients are derived below. In addition, expres-
sions for reproductive values v = [v1,v2] and u = [u1,u2]T (T denoting transposition) are obtained
by calculating the left and right eigenvectors of the resident transition matrix A. However, results
are long and not very informative, so we will not provide these eigenvectors here.
S2.3 Identity between allele copies
Writing Qi for the equilibrium probability of identity between two copies of a phenotype determi-
nation allele sampled in two distinct adults (i.e., sampling without replacement) in environment i,
we have
Qi =
2∑
k=1
pkσk→i∑2
`=1 p`σ`→i
h2ki
(
1
4
+
1
2
`+
1
4
`2
)(
1
n
+
n−1
n
Qk
)
(S6)
hki =
(1−d)
Cki (f, f)
fkω1i + (1− fk)ω2i
fkβk + (1− fk)γk
. (S7)
With probability pkσk→i/
∑2
`=1 p`σ`→i the local patch was in environmental state ek at the time the
current adults were born. Both sampled individuals are native to the local patch with probability h2ki.
Both sampled individuals either have inherited their allele copies maternally with probability 1/4.
Both individuals either descend from the same mother with probability 1/n or from a different
mother with probability (n − 1)/n, in which case both mothers share alleles with probability Qk.
With probability 2× 14`, one individual has inherited its allele from a locally mating father while
the other individual inherited its allele maternally. Again, with probability 1/n, both sampled
individuals either descend from the same parent, whereas with probability (n− 1)/n both descend
from different parents. Finally, with probability 14`
2, both individuals have inherited their alleles
from a locally mating father. We can then solve the recursions in equation (S6) for the equilibrium
values of Qˆ1 and Qˆ2 and substitute the resulting values in the expressions below.
S2.4 Maternal expression: relatedness
To calculate relatedness, we require an expression of the regression rk between the recipient’s
genotypic value G and the phenotype Pk of the kth actor: rk = cov(G,Pk)/cov(G,P) (e.g., eq. [4] in
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Taylor et al., 2007). As we are considering haploid inheritance, cov(G,P) = 1, so we only require
an expression for cov(G,Pk). The coefficient rˆfi reflects the covariance between the genetic value
of a focal adult recipient who is, by definition, a mutant, hence G = 1 and the phenotypes Poff,eggs
of her own mutant offspring born from her eggs. In case of maternal expression, the phenotypes
of these offspring are expressed by the focal mutant mother itself, so these offspring have a mutant
phenotype with certainty (Poff,eggs = 1). Hence, we have
rˆfi = 1. (S8)
The relatedness coefficient rˆmi reflects the covariance between the genetic value of a focal mutant
adult recipient and its own, locally sired, mutant offspring born from its sperm. Again G = 1 by
definition as the focal bears the mutant allele. With probability 1/n, the focal adult is also the
mother (selfing), so that Poff,sperm = 1. Alternatively, with probability (1−n)/n, another local adult
is the mother, and the probability that she bears the mutant allele is Qˆi, in which case Poff,sperm = 1.
In any other case, Poff,sperm = 0. Hence, we have
rˆmi =
1
n
+
n−1
n
Qˆi. (S9)
Note that ` does not occur in the expression above as rˆmi is conditional upon a sire mating locally.
The relatedness coefficient rˆm,remotei is given by
rˆm,remotei = 0,
as the phenotype of a male’s remotely sired offspring is determined by a remote mother, who does
not bear the mutant allele.
The relatedness coefficient r˜fi reflects the covariance between the focal mutant adult (G = 1)
when acting as a female and the average phenotype of her brood. However, as all offspring in her
brood express the mutant maternal phenotype by definition, we have
r˜fi = 1. (S10)
The relatedness coefficient r¯i between a focal mutant adult and any locally born juvenile is
r¯i =
1
n
+
n−1
n
Qˆi (S11)
as with probability 1/n, the locally born offspring has the mutant adult recipient as its mother, so
that the phenotype is given by Poff = 1. Alternatively, with probability (n− 1)/n, the locally born
offspring has another mother, who shares the mutant allele with probability Qˆi.
S2.5 Offspring expression: relatedness
The relatedness coefficient rˆfi reflects the covariance between a focal mutant adult female recipi-
ent (G = 1) and the phenotype of her mutant offspring. As the phenotype is expressed by these
offspring, Pk = 1, so
rˆfi = 1. (S12)
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By the same argument, rˆmi in the case of offspring control is given by
rˆmi = rˆ
m,remote
i = 1. (S13)
While r˜fi is now given by
r˜fi =
1
2
+
1
2
`
(
1
n
+
n−1
n
Qˆi
)
(S14)
as 1/2 of the brood, on average, have received an allele copy from their focal mutant mother (hence
a mutant copy by definition), and the phenotype of those offspring is Pk = 1. By contrast, the other
1/2 of the brood receive their allele copy paternally. With probability `, the father is one of the
local breeders: with probability 1/n, mother and father are identical (selfing occurs), so that again
offspring inherit a mutant copy. With probability (n − 1)/n, however, individuals have a distinct
mother and father, and both share alleles with probability Qˆi.
Relatedness r¯i between a focal adult individual and any locally born offspring is given by
r¯i =
1
2
(
1
n
+
n−1
n
Qˆi
)
+
1
2
`
(
1
n
+
n−1
n
Qˆi
)
, (S15)
where with probability 1/2, the sampled locally born offspring inherits its gene copy maternally.
With probability 1/n, it is born from the focal adult, so that identity is 1. Alternatively, with prob-
ability (n−1)/n, the individual has a different mother, who bears the mutant allele with probability
Qˆi. Alternatively, with probability 1/2 · `, the sampled offspring inherits its gene copy paternally
and the father is one of the local individuals. With probability 1/n, the father is the focal individual,
whereas with probability (n−1)/n, the father is one of the other individuals in the local patch.
S2.6 Numerical solutions
To calculate the battleground, we calculate the equilibrium values of f ∗1 and f
∗
2 by numerically
iterating the dynamic (Dieckmann & Law, 1996; McGill & Brown, 2007)[
f1
f2
]
t+1
=
[
f1
f2
]
t
+C
[ F1
F2
]
t
from the initial point [ f1, f2]t=0 = [0.5,0.5] until convergence. The parameter C denotes a constant
which reflects the effective rate at which new mutations arise in a population (e.g., McGill & Brown,
2007; Dercole & Rinaldi, 2008), which is C = 0.01 throughout the current study. We assume that
convergence occurs when | fi,t − fi,t−1|< 10−8. Numerical iterations are coded in Mathematica and
C and are available on github: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.826693.
S2.7 Resolving the conflict: fitness expressions
We note that the probability fi of producing z1 offspring in environment ei is now given by
fi (si,qS,qNS) = siqS + (1− si)qNS. (S16)
Considering the evolution of maternal signaling, we write fi (si)≡ fi (si,qS,qNS).We then have
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w ji =
1
2
fi
(
sˆfi
)
fi
(
s˜fi
)
βi +
(
1− fi
(
s˜fi
))
γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω1 j
C ji (¯s,s)
+d
2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω1 j
C jk (s,s)
]
+
1
2
fi
(
sˆfi
)
fi
(
s˜fi
)
βi +
(
1− fi
(
s˜fi
))
γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω2 j
C ji (¯s,s)
+d
2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω2 j
C jk (s,s)
]
+
1
2
`
fi
(
sˆmi
)
fi (s¯i)βi + (1− fi (s¯i))γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω1 j
C ji (¯s,s)
+d
2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω1 j
C jk (s,s)
]
+
1
2
`
fi
(
sˆmi
)
fi (s¯i)βi + (1− fi (s¯i))γi
[
(1−d)
nσi→ jω2 j
C ji (¯s,s)
+d
2∑
k=1
pknσk→ jω2 j
C jk (s,s)
]
+
1
2
(1− `)
2∑
k=1
pk
fk
(
sˆm,remotek
)
fk (sk)βk + (1− fk (sk))γk
[
(1−d)
nσk→ jω1 j
C jk (s,s)
+d
2∑
h=1
phnσh→ jω1 j
C jh (s,s)
]
+
1
2
(1− `)
2∑
k=1
pk
fk
(
sˆm,remotek
)
fk (sk)βk + (1− fk (sk))γk
[
(1−d)
nσk→ jω2 j
C jk (s,s)
+d
2∑
h=1
phnσh→ jω2 j
C jh (s,s)
]
. (S17)
The total number C ji of locally competing juveniles in an environment e j patch that was previously
in state ei is given by
C ji(¯s,s) =
n
fi (s¯i)βi + (1− fi (s¯i))γi
(1−d)
(
fi (s¯i)ω1 j + (1− fi (s¯i))ω2 j
)
+m j (s) (S18)
m j (s) = d
2∑
k=1
pk
n
fi (si)βi + (1− fk (si))γi
(
fi (si)ω1 j + (1− fk (si))ω2 j
)
. (S19)
With regards to offspring responsiveness to the maternal signal, we write q = [qS,qNS] and fi (q)≡
fi (si,qS,qNS). We then have
w ji =
1
2
fi
(
qˆf
)
fi
(
q˜f
)
βi +
(
1− fi
(
q˜f
))
γi
[
(1−d)
σi→ jω1 j
C ji (q¯,q)
+d
2∑
k=1
pkσk→ jω1 j
C jk (q,q)
]
+
1
2
fi
(
qˆf
)
fi
(
q˜f
)
βi +
(
1− fi
(
q˜f
))
γi
[
(1−d)
σi→ jω2 j
C ji (q¯,q)
+d
2∑
k=1
pkσk→ jω2 j
C jk (q,q)
]
+
1
2
`
fi
(
qˆm
)
fi (q¯)βi + (1− fi (q¯))γi
[
(1−d)
σi→ jω1 j
C ji (q¯,q)
+d
2∑
k=1
pkσk→ jω1 j
C jk (q,q)
]
+
1
2
`
fi
(
qˆm
)
fi (q¯)βi + (1− fi (q¯))γi
[
(1−d)
σi→ jω2 j
C ji (q¯,q)
+d
2∑
k=1
pkσk→ jω2 j
C jk (q,q)
]
+
1
2
(1− `)
2∑
k=1
pk
fk
(
qˆm,remote
)
fk (q)βk + (1− fk (q))γk
[
(1−d)
σk→ jω1 j
C jk (q,q)
+d
2∑
h=1
phσh→ jω1 j
C jh (q,q)
]
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+
1
2
(1− `)
2∑
k=1
pk
fk
(
qˆm,remote
)
fk (q)βk + (1− fk (q))γk
[
(1−d)
σk→ jω2 j
C jk (q,q)
+d
2∑
h=1
phσh→ jω2 j
C jh (q,q)
]
. (S20)
Expressions for C ji (q,q) and m j (q) can be derived in the same fashion as shown for eqns. (S18,
S19).
S2.8 Resolving the conflict: selection gradients
Similar to eq. (S5), selection gradients on the maternal signal si are given by
Si =
∑
j={1,2}
∑
k={1,2}
v juk
[
∂b jk
∂sˆfi
rˆfk +
∂b jk
∂s˜fi
s˜fk
+
∂b jk
∂sˆmi
rˆmk +
∂b jk
∂sˆm,remotei
rˆm,remotek +
∂b jk
∂s¯i
r¯k
]∣∣∣∣∣
sˆf=sˆm=s˜f=s¯=s
, (S21)
with relatedness coefficients given by eqns. (S8-S11). Selection gradients on the offspring pheno-
type determination strategy qi ∈ (qS,qNS) are given by
Qi =
∑
j={1,2}
∑
k={1,2}
v juk
[
∂b jk
∂qˆfi
rˆfk +
∂b jk
∂s˜fi
s˜fk
+
∂b jk
∂qˆmi
rˆmk +
∂b jk
∂qˆm,remotei
rˆm,remotek +
∂b jk
∂q¯i
r¯k
]∣∣∣∣∣
qˆf=qˆm=q˜f=q¯=q
, (S22)
with relatedness coefficients given by eqns. (S12-S15).
S2.9 Individual-based simulations
We also ran individual-based simulations to check that our model is robust to demographic stochas-
ticity, finite population sizes and genetic variation. Moreover, individual-based simulations also
showed that populations that arrived at the candidate ESS signaling or phenotype determination
strategy did not undergo evolutionary branching (Geritz et al., 1998). To this end, we simulated
a population of N = 2000 hermaphroditic individuals distributed over N/n patches. At the start of
each generation, each individual chooses a random sperm donor among the n individuals in the
local patch (including itself). Each individual bears four unlinked, diploid gene loci, which corre-
spond to the traits s1, s2, qS and qNS, where alleles of each locus were assumed to have additive
effects. Upon inheritance, each allele independently mutates with probability µ, which involves
adding a random number from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance ν2 = 1×10−4 to its
current allelic value (i.e., a continuum-of-alleles model: Kimura & Crow, 1964). Subsequently, an
offspring’s phenotype is determined by drawing a randomly chosen number X from a uniform dis-
tribution: the offspring will attain a z1 phenotype in case X < smotheri q
offspring
S + (1− s
mother
i )q
offspring
NS
and a z2 phenotype otherwise. Superscripts ‘mother’ and ‘offspring’ denote whether the trait value
is expressed by mother or offspring. At the start of each generation, each adult breeder has R = 200
units of resources to produce offspring, where the costs of producing an individual offspring is
given by the parameters βi and γi (see section “phenotype determination” in the main text). After
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birth, offspring disperse with probability d to a randomly chosen patch. Subsequently, the envi-
ronment in each patch changes with probability σi→ j, after which survival takes place among the
immigrant and philopatric juveniles in each patch. Maladapted individuals survive with a probabil-
ity c1 or c2 dependent on the local environment, whereas adapted individuals always survive. For
each patch, juveniles are then randomly drawn to replace the adult breeders, after which the cy-
cle repeats. Unless indicated otherwise, simulations ran for 20 000 generations, which guaranteed
convergence to equilibria for all inspected cases. Simulations are coded in C and are available at
zenodo/github: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.826693.
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